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ABSTRACT: How many words – and which ones – are sufficient to define all other words? 
When dictionaries are analyzed as directed graphs with links from defining words to defined 
words, they turn out to have latent structure that has not previously been noticed. 
Recursively removing all those words that are reachable by definition but do not define any 
further words reduces the dictionary to a Kernel of 10%, but this is still not the smallest 
number of words that can define all the rest. About 75% of the Kernel is its Core, a strongly 
connected subset (with a definitional path to and from any word and any other word within 
it), but the Core cannot define all the rest of the dictionary. The 25% surrounding the Core 
are Satellites, small strongly connected subsets. The size of the smallest set of words that 
can define all the rest – a graph’s “minimum feedback vertex set” or MinSet – is about 1% of 
the dictionary, about 15% of the Kernel, about half-Core and half-Satellite, but every 
dictionary has a huge number of MinSets. The words in the Core turn out to be learned 
earlier, more frequent, and less concrete than the Satellites, which are learned earlier and 
more frequent but more concrete than the rest of the Dictionary. The findings are related to 
the symbol grounding problem and the mental lexicon. 
The Representation of Meaning. One can argue that the set of all the written words of a 
language constitutes the biggest and richest digital database of all. Numbers and 
algorithms are just special cases of words and sentences, so they are all part of that same 
global verbal database. Analog images are not words, but even their digitized versions only 
become tractable once they are sufficiently tagged with verbal descriptions. So in the end it 
all comes down to words. But how are the meanings of words represented? There are two 
prominent representations of word meaning: one is in our external dictionaries and the 
other is in our brains: our “mental lexicon.” How are the two related? 
The Symbol Grounding Problem. We consult a dictionary in order to learn the meaning 
of a word whose meaning we do not yet already know. Its meaning is not yet in our mental 
lexicon. The dictionary conveys that meaning to us through a definition consisting of further 
words, whose meanings we already know. If a definition contains words whose meanings 
we do not yet know, we can look up their definitions too. But it is clear that meaning cannot 
be dictionary look-up all the way down. The meanings of some words, at least, have to be 
learned by some means other than dictionary look-up, otherwise word meaning is 
ungrounded: It is just strings of meaningless symbols (defining words) pointing to 
meaningless symbols (defined words). This is the “symbol grounding problem” (Harnad 
1990). 
This paper addresses the question of how many words – and which words – have to be 
learned (grounded) by means other than dictionary look-up so that all the rest of the words 
in the dictionary can be defined either directly, using solely those grounded words, or, 
recursively, using further words that can themselves be defined using solely those 
grounded words. Let us call those grounded words in our mental lexicon -- the ones 
sufficient to define all the others -- a “Grounding Set.”  
Category Learning. The process of word grounding itself is the subject of other ongoing 
work on the sensorimotor learning of categories (Harnad 2005; Blondin Massé et al 2013). 
Here we just note that almost all the words in any dictionary (nouns, verbs, adjectives and 
adverbs) are “content” words1, meaning that they are the names of categories (objects, 
individuals, kinds, states, actions, events, properties, relations) of various degrees of 
abstractness. Many of those categories, and hence the words that name them, can be 
learned directly through trial-and-error sensorimotor experience, guided by feedback that 
indicates whether an attempted categorization was correct or incorrect. A grounding set 
composed of such experientially grounded words would then be enough to allow the 
meaning of all further words to be learned through verbal definition alone. 
Expressive Power. Perhaps the most remarkable and powerful feature of natural 
language is the fact that it can say anything and everything that can be said (Katz 1978). 
There exists no language in which you can say this, but not that. (Pick a pair of languages 
and try it out.) Word-for-word translation may not work: you may not be able to say 
everything in the same number of words, equally succinctly, or equally elegantly, in the 
same form. But you will always be able to translate in paraphrase the propositional content 
of anything and everything said in any one language into any other language. (If you think 
that may still leave out anything that can be said, just say it in any language at all and it will 
prove to be sayable in all the others too; Steklis & Harnad 1976.) 
One counter-intuition about this is that the language may lack the words: its vocabulary 
may be insufficient: How can you explain quantum mechanics in the language of isolated 
Amazonian hunter-gatherers? But one can ask the very same question about how you can 
explain it to an American 6-year-old – or, for that matter, to an eighteenth century physicist. 
And the banal answer is that it takes time, and a lot of words, to explain -- but you can 
always do it, in any language. Where do all those missing words come from, if not from the 
same language? We coin (i.e., lexicalize) words all the time, as they are needed, but we 
are coining them within the same language. Nor are most of the new words we coin labels 
for unique new experiences, like names for new colors (e.g., “ochre”) or new odors 
(“acetic”) that you have to see or smell directly at first hand in order to know what the words 
refer to. 
Consider the German word “Schadenfreude” for example. There happens to be no single 
word for this in English. It means “feeling glee at another’s misfortune.” English is highly 
assimilative, so instead of bothering to coin a new English word (say, “misfortune-glee,” or, 
more latinately, “malfelicity”) whose definition is “glee at another’s misfortune,” English has 
simply adopted Schadenfreude as part of its own lexicon. All it needed was to be defined, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Content	  or	  Open	  Class	  words	  are	  growing	  in	  all	  spoken	  languages	  all	  the	  time.	  In	  contrast,	  Function	  or	  Closed	  Class	  words	  like	  if,	  off,	  is,	  or	  his	  are	  few	  and	  fixed,	  with	  mostly	  a	  formal	  or	  syntactic	  function:	  Our	  study	  considers	  only	  content	  words.	  Definitions	  are	  treated	  as	  unordered	  strings	  of	  content	  words,	  ignoring	  function	  words,	  syntax	  and	  polysemy	  (i.e,	  multiple	  meanings,	  of	  which	  we	  use	  only	  the	  first	  and	  most	  common	  meaning	  for	  each	  word-­‐form).	  
and then it could be added to the English dictionary. The shapes of words themselves are 
arbitrary, after all, as Saussure (1911/1972) noted: words do not resemble the things they 
refer to. 
So what gives English or any language its limitless expressive power is its capacity to 
define anything with words. But is this defining power really limitless? First, we have 
already skipped over one special case that eludes language’s grasp, and that is new 
sensations that you have to experience at first hand in order to know what they are – hence 
to understand what any word referring to them means. But even if we set aside words for 
new sensations, what about other words, like Schadenfreude? That does not refer to a new 
sensory experience. We understand what it refers to because we understand what the 
words “glee at another’s misfortune” refer to. That definition is itself a combination of 
words, and we have to understand those words in order to understand the definition. If we 
don’t understand some of the words, we can of course look up their definitions too – but as 
we have noted, it cannot be dictionary look-ups all the way down! The meanings of some 
words, at least (e.g., “glee”) need to have been grounded in direct experience, whereas 
others (e.g., “another” or “misfortune”) may be grounded in the meaning of words that are 
grounded in the meaning of words… that are grounded in direct experience. 
Direct Sensorimotor Grounding. How the meaning of a word referring to a sensation like 
“glee” can be grounded in direct experience is fairly straightforward: It’s much the same as 
teaching the meaning of “ochre” or “acetic”: “Look (sniff): that’s ochre (acetic) and look 
(sniff) that’s not.” “Glee” is likewise a category of perceptual experience. To teach someone 
which experience “glee” is, you need to point to examples that are members of the 
category “glee” and examples that are not: “Look, that’s glee” – pointing to someone who 
looks and acts and has reason to feel gleeful - and “Look, that’s not glee” – pointing2 to 
someone who looks and acts and has reason to feel ungleeful (Harnad 2005).  
What about the categories denoted by the words “another” and “misfortune”? These are 
not direct, concrete sensory categories, but they still have examples in our direct 
sensorimotor experience: “That’s you” and “that’s another” (i.e., someone else). “That’s 
good fortune” and “that’s misfortune.” But it is more likely that higher-order, more abstract 
categories like these would be grounded in verbal definitions composed of words that each 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Wittgenstein	  had	  some	  cautions	  about	  the	  possibility	  of	  grounding	  words	  for	  private	  experiences	  because	  there	  would	  be	  no	  basis	  for	  correcting	  errors.	  But	  thanks	  to	  our	  “mirror	  neurons”	  and	  our	  “mind-­‐reading”	  capacity	  we	  are	  adept	  at	  inferring	  most	  private	  experiences	  from	  their	  accompanying	  public	  behavior,	  and	  reasonable	  agreement	  on	  word	  meaning	  can	  be	  reached	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  common	  experience	  together	  with	  these	  observable	  behavioral	  correlates	  (Apperley	  2010).	  Because	  of	  the	  “other-­‐minds	  problem”	  -­‐-­‐	  i.e.,	  because	  the	  only	  experiences	  you	  can	  have	  are	  your	  own	  -­‐-­‐	  there	  is	  no	  way	  to	  know	  for	  sure	  whether	  private	  experiences	  accompanied	  by	  the	  same	  public	  behavior	  are	  indeed	  identical	  experiences.	  These	  subtleties	  do	  not	  enter	  into	  the	  analyses	  being	  done	  in	  this	  paper.	  Word	  meaning	  is	  in	  any	  case	  not	  exact but	  approximate	  in	  all	  fields	  other	  than	  formal	  mathematics	  and	  logic.	  Even	  observable,	  empirical	  categories	  can	  only	  be	  defined	  or	  described	  provisionally	  and	  approximately.	  Like	  a	  picture	  or	  an	  object,	  an	  experience	  is	  always	  worth	  more	  than	  a	  thousand	  (or	  any	  number)	  of	  words	  (Harnad	  1987).	  
name already grounded categories, rather than being grounded in direct sensorimotor 
experience. 
Dictionary Grounding. This brings us to the question that is being addressed in this 
paper: A dictionary provides an (approximate) definition for every word in the language. 
Apart from a small, fixed set of words whose role is mainly syntactic (“function words,” e.g. 
articles, particles, conjunctions), all the rest of the words in the dictionary are the names of 
categories (“content words,” i.e. nouns, verbs, adjectives, adverbs). How many content 
words (i) -- and which ones (ii) -- need to be grounded already so that all the rest can be 
learned from definitions composed only out of those grounded words? The answer may 
cast light on how the meaning of words is represented – externally, in dictionaries, and 
internally, in our mental lexicon -- as well as on the evolutionary origin and adaptive 
function of language for our species (Blondin Massé et al. 2013). 
Synopsis of Findings. Before we describe in detail what we did, and how, here is a 
synopsis of what we found: Dictionaries turn out to have a latent structure that has not 
previously been reported by others, as far as we know. Dictionaries have a special subset 
of words – about 10% (Table 1; Figure 1) -- that we have called their “Kernel”. The Kernel 
is unique, and its words can define the remaining 90% of the dictionary. The Kernel is 
hence a grounding set. But it is not the smallest grounding set. That smallest subset – 
which we have called the “Minimal Grounding Set” (MinSet) -- is much smaller than the 
Kernel (about 1% of the dictionary and about 15% of the Kernel), but it is not unique: The 
Kernel contains a huge number of different MinSets; each of them is of that same minimum 
size and each is able to define all the other words in the dictionary. The Kernel also turns 
out to have further latent structure: About 75% of the Kernel turns out to be one huge 
“strongly connected subset” (i.e., one within which there is a definitional path between any 
two words in both directions), which we call the Kernel’s “Core.” The remaining 25% of the 
Kernel surrounding the Core consists of many tiny strongly connected subsets, which we 
call the Core’s “Satellites.” It turns out that each MinSet is part-Core and part Satellite. The 
words in these different latent structures also turn out to differ in their psycholinguistic 
properties: As we go deeper into the dictionary, from the 90% Rest to the 10% Kernel, to 
the Satellites (1-4%) surrounding the Kernel’s Core, to the Core itself (6-9%), the words 
turn out on average to be more frequently used (orally and in writing) and to have been 
learned at a younger age. This is reflected in a gradient within the Satellite layer: the 
shorter a word’s definitional distance (the number of definitional steps to reach it) from the 
Core, the more frequently it is used and the earlier it was learned. The average 
concreteness of the words in the Core and the Rest outside the Kernel is about the same. 
Within the Satellite layer, however, words become more concrete the greater their 
definitional distance from the Core. There is also a (much weaker) definitional distance 
gradient from the Kernel outward into the Rest of the dictionary for age and concreteness, 
but not for frequency. We will now describe how this latent structure was discovered. 
Control Vocabularies. Our investigation began with two small, special dictionaries – the 
Cambridge International Dictionary of English (47,147 words; Procter 1995; henceforth 
Cambridge) and the Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English (69,223 words; Procter 
1978; henceforth Longman) (Table 1). These two dictionaries were created especially for 
people with limited English vocabularies, such as non-native speakers; all words are 
defined using only a “control” vocabulary of 2000 words that users are likely to know 
already. Our objective was to analyze each dictionary as a directed graph (digraph) in 
which there is a directional link from each defining word to each defined word. Each word 
in the dictionary should be reachable, either directly or indirectly, via definitions composed 
of the 2000-word control vocabulary. 
A direct analysis of the graphs of Longman and Cambridge, however, revealed that their 
underlying control-vocabulary principle was not faithfully followed: There turned out to be 
words in each dictionary that were not defined using only the 2000-word “control” 
vocabulary, and there were also words that were not defined at all. So we decided to use 
each dictionary’s digraph (a directed graph with arrows pointing from the words in each 
definition to the word they define) to work backward in order to see if we could generate a 
genuine control vocabulary out of which all the other words could be defined. (We first 
removed all undefined words.) 
Dictionaries as Graphs. Dictionaries can be represented as directed graphs 𝐷   =    (𝑉,𝐴) 
(digraphs). The vertices are words and the arcs connect defining words to defined words, 
i.e. there is an arc from word u to word v if u is a word in the definition of v. Moreover, in a 
complete dictionary, every word is defined by at least one word, so we assume that there is 
no word without an incoming arc. A path is a sequence (𝑣!, 𝑣!,… , 𝑣!) of vertices such that (𝑣! , 𝑣!!!) is an arc for 𝑖   =   1,2,… , 𝑘 − 1. A circuit is a path starting and ending at the same 
vertex. A graph is called acyclic if it does not contain any circuits. 
Grounding Sets. Let 𝑈 ⊆ 𝑉 be any subset of words and let u be some given word. We are 
interested in computing all words that can be learned through definitions composed only of 
words in U. This can be stated recursively as follows: We say that u is learnable from U if 
either u belongs to U or all predecessors of u are learnable from U. The set of words that 
can be learned from U is denoted by L(U). In particular, if 𝐿(𝑈)   =   𝑉, then U is called a 
grounding set of D. Intuitively, a set U is a grounding set if, provided we already know the 
meaning of all the words in U, we can learn the meaning of all the remaining words just by 
looking up the definitions of the unknown words (in the right order). 
Grounding sets are equivalent to well-known sets in graph theory called feedback vertex 
sets. These are sets of vertices U that cover all circuits, i.e. for any circuit c, there is at 
least one of c belonging to U. It is rather easy to see this. On the one hand, if there exists a 
circuit of unknown words, then there is no way to learn any of them by definition alone. On 
the other hand, if every circuit is covered, then the graph of unknown words is acyclic, 
which means that the meaning of at least one word can be learned – a word having no 
unknown predecessor (Blondin Massé et al 2008)). 
Clearly, every dictionary D has many grounding sets. For example, the set of all words in D 
is itself a grounding set. But how small can grounding sets be? In other words, what is the 
smallest number of words you need to know already in order to be able to learn the 
meaning of all the remaining words in D through definition alone? These are the Minimal 
Grounding Sets (MinSets) mentioned earlier. It is already known that finding a minimum 
feedback vertex set in a general digraph is NP-hard (Karp, 1972), which implies that finding 
Minsets is also NP-hard. Hence, it is highly unlikely that one will ever find an algorithm that 
solves the problem without taking an exponentially long time. However, since some real 
dictionary graphs are relatively small and also seem to be structured in a favorable way, 
there are ways to compute their MinSets. 
Kernel. As a first step, we observed that, in all dictionaries analyzed so far, there exist 
many words that are never used in any definition. These words can be removed without 
changing the MinSets. This reduction can be repeated iteratively until no further word can 
be removed without leaving any word unlearnable from the rest. The resulting subgraph is 
what we called the dictionary’s (grounding) Kernel. Each dictionary’s Kernel is unique, in 
the sense that every dictionary has one and only one Kernel. The Kernels of our two small 
dictionaries, Longman and Cambridge turned out to amount to 8% and 7% of the dictionary 
as a whole, respectively. We have since extended the analysis to two larger dictionaries, 
Merriam-Webser (248,466 words; Webster 2006; henceforth Webster) and  Wordnet 
(132,477 words; Fellbaum 2010) whose Kernels are both 12% of the dictionary as a whole 
(Table 1). 
Core and Satellites. Next, since we are dealing with directed graphs, we can divide the 
words according to their strongly connected components. Two words u and v are strongly 
connected if there exists a path from u to v as well as a path from v to u. There is a well-
known algorithm in graph theory that computes the strongly connected components 
(SCCs) very efficiently (Tarjan 1972). It turns out that in the Kernel of all four dictionaries 
we have analyzed so far there is one SCC that is much bigger than all the rest: it is about 
75% of the Kernel and about 7-8% of the dictionary as a whole. It is this largest strongly 
connected component of a dictionary’s Kernel that we call the Kernel’s Core. All the 
remaining strongly connected components in the Kernel (about 25% of the Kernel and 
about 1-2% of the dictionary as a whole) constitute the Kernel’s Satellites. 
Definitional Distance from the Kernel: the K-Hierarchy. Another potentially informative 
graph-theoretic property is the “definitional distance” of any given word from the Kernel or 
from the Core in terms of the number of arcs separating them. We define these two 
distance hierarchies as follows. First, for the Kernel hierarchy, suppose K is the Kernel of a 
dictionary graph D. Then, for any word u, we define its distance recursively as follows: 
1. 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡(𝑢)   =   0, if u is in K;  
2. 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡(𝑢)   =   1  +   𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡(𝑣) ∶ 𝑣  is  a  predecessor  of  𝑢}, otherwise. 
 
In other words, to compute the distance between K, as origin, and any word u in the rest of 
D, we compute the distance of all words defining u and add one. This distance is well 
defined, because K is a grounding set of D and hence the procedure cannot cycle because 
every circuit is covered. The mapping that relates every word to its distance from the K is 
called the K-hierarchy. 
Definitional Distance from the Core: the C-Hierarchy. The second metric is slightly 
more complicated but based on the same idea. Let D be the directed graph of a dictionary, 
and D’ be the graph obtained from D by merging each strongly connected component 
(SCC) into a single vertex. The resulting graph is acyclic. We can then compute the 
distance of any word from the Core (the vertex corresponding to the biggest of the merged 
strongly connected components of the Kernel) as follows: 
1. 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡(𝑢)   =   0, if u is in a source vertex of D’;  
2. 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡(𝑢)   =   1  +   𝑚𝑎 {𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡(𝑣) ∶ 𝑣  is  in  a  predecessor  merged  vertex  of  𝑢}, otherwise. 
 
The words in the merged vertices of the Core have no predecessor and constitute the 
origin of the C-hierarchy for two of our four dictionaries, and level 1 for the other two 
(because of a tiny, probably artefactual predecessor). The distance from C of the words at 
each succeeding level is computed by taking the minimum among the predecessors plus 
one. Like the K-hierarchy, the C-hierarchy is well defined because G’ is acyclic.  
MinSets. We have computed the Kernel K, Core C, and Satellites S as well as the K-
hierarchy and the C-hierarchy for four English dictionaries: two smaller ones -- (1) 
Longman’s Dictionary of Contemporary English (Longman, 47147 words), (2) Cambridge’s 
International Dictionary of English (Cambridge, 69, 223 words) – and two larger ones - (3) 
Merriam-Webster (Webster, 248,466 words), (4) WordNet (132,477 words). Because of 
polysemy (multiple meanings)3, there can be more than one word with the same word-form 
(lexeme). As an approximation, for each stemmatized word-form we used only the first 
(and most frequent) meaning for each part of speech of that word-form (noun, verb, 
adjective, adverb). This reduced the total number of words by 50% for the smaller 
dictionaries and by 65% for the larger dictionaries.  The size of their respective Kernels 
turned out to be between 8% of the whole dictionary for the smaller dictionaries and 12% 
for the larger dictionaries. The Kernel itself varied from 10% Satellite and 90% Core for the 
two small dictionaries to 35% Satellite and 65% Core for the two large dictionaries (Table 
1). 
As noted earlier, computing the MinSets is much more demanding than computing K, C 
and S, because the problem is NP-hard. As a first step, we represented the problem as a 
linear integer program in which the constraints are given by the circuits. In a general 
digraph, the number of these constraints grows exponentially, but in the special case of 
dictionaries and their structure, it was possible to concentrate on the shortest circuits. Next, 
we tried to solve the linear program using the powerful CPLEX solver. For the smaller 
dictionaries Longman and Cambridge we were able to compute a few MinSets (though not 
all of them, because there are a very large number). For Webster and WordNet, we could 
only compute some almost-minimal sets, by using the best solution found by CPLEX after 
many days of computation.4  
These analyses answered our first question about the size of the MinSet for these four 
dictionaries (373 and 452 words for the small dictionaries; 1396 and 1094 for the larger 
ones; about 1% for each dictionary). But because, unlike a dictionary’s unique Kernel, its 
MinSets are not unique, a dictionary has a vast number of MinSets, all within the Kernel, all 
the same minimal size, but each one different in terms of which combination of Core and 
Satellite words it is composed of. The natural question to ask now is whether the words 
contained in these latent components of the dictionary, identified via their graph-theoretic 
properties -- the MinSets, Core, Satellites, Kernel and the rest of the dictionary – differ from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Once	  the	  problem	  of	  polysemy	  is	  solved	  for	  both	  defined	  and	  defining	  words,	  the	  analysis	  described	  in	  this	  paper	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  each	  unique	  word/meaning	  pair	  instead	  of	  just	  to	  the	  first	  meaning	  of	  each	  defined	  word.	  4	  This	  is	  yet	  another	  approximation	  in	  a	  study	  that	  necessitated	  many	  approximations:	  ignoring	  syntax	  and	  word	  order,	  using	  only	  the	  first	  meaning,	  and	  finding	  only	  something	  close	  to	  the	  MinSet	  for	  the	  biggest	  dictionaries.	  Despite	  all	  these	  approximations	  and	  potential	  sources	  of	  error,	  systematic	  and	  interpretable	  effects	  emerged	  from	  the	  data.	  
one another in any systematic way that might give a clue as to the function (if any) of any 
of the different latent structures identified by our analysis. 
  
Table 1. Number and percentage of word-meanings for each latent structure in each of the 
four dictionaries used (plus averages for game-generated dictionaries). Based on using 
only the first word-meaning for each stemmatized part of speech wherever there are 
multiple meanings (hence multiple words). 
 
Cambridge Longman Webster WordNet
Game	  
dictionaries	  
(average)
Total	  words	  meanings 47147 69223 248466 132477 182
First	  sense	  meanings 25132 31026 91388 85195 -­‐
Rest 22891	  (91%) 28700	  (93%) 80433	  (88%) 75393	  (88%) 10.14(7%)
Kernel 2241	  (9%) 2326	  (8%) 10955	  (12%) 9802	  (12%) 171.68	  (93%)
Satellites 232	  (1%) 540	  (2%) 2978	  (3%) 3410	  (4%) 54.47	  (29%)
Core 2009	  (8%) 1786	  (6%) 7977	  (9%) 6392	  (8%) 117.21	  (64%)
MinSets 373	  (1%) 452	  (1%) 1396	  (2%) 1094	  (1%) 32.81	  (18%)
Satellites-­‐MinSets 59	  (16%) 167	  (37%) 596	  (	  43%) 532	  (49%) 20.59	  (63%)
Core-­‐MinSets 314	  (84%) 285	  (63%) 800	  (57%) 562	  (51%) 12.22	  (37%)
 Figure 1. Overall pattern of average psycholinguistic differences (age of acquisition, 
concreteness, frequency) among the words in the latent structures revealed by the 
analysis of the dictionary digraph. Pattern is the same for all four dictionaries 
analyzed but image is not drawn to scale: for exact numbers and percentages see 
Table 1 and Figures 2 & 6). (MinSets are part Core and part Satellite. Core + 
Satellites = Kernel [~10%]. Outside the Kernel is the Rest [~90%]). Core words are 
more frequent (blue) and learned younger (orange) than the Rest of the dictionary. 
Within the Kernel’s Satellite layer, this difference increases gradually as definitional 
distance from the Core increases. Outside the Kernel, for age, the difference 
decreases gradually (but weakly) as definitional distance from the Kernel increases; 
frequency remains uniform. For concreteness (green), it is the Satellite layer that is 
more concrete than the Core. This difference increases gradually as definitional 
distance from the Core increases within the Satellite layer of the Kernel. Outside the 
Kernel, concreteness is at first equal to the Core and then increases gradually (but 
weakly) as definitional distance from the Kernel increases. 
 
Psycholinguistic Correlates of Dictionary Latent Structure. A number of databases 
have been compiled that index various psycholinguistic properties of words (e.g., Wilson 
1988). We used three of them: For word frequency, we used the SUBTLEX¬US Corpus, 
which has been found to be more reliable than the widely used Kučera and Francis (1967) 
word frequency norms (Brysbaert & New, 2009). Raw frequencies range from 1 to over 2 
million, with an average of 669 and with about 1% of the values over 5000. For our goal of 
determining the average frequency for different sets of words, instead of using raw 
frequency, we used the Lg10WF metric (log10(FREQcount+1)) to reduce the effect of 
extreme values. For concreteness, the Brysbaert et al. (2013) concreteness ratings for 
40,000 commonly known English word lemmas were used. For age of acquisition, we used 
the Kuperman et al. (2012) age-of-acquisition ratings for 30,000 English words. 
We tested whether the words in the latent components we identified in dictionary graphs 
differ systematically in frequency, concreteness or age of acquisition. Our overall pattern of 
findings (for all four dictionaries) is illustrated in Figure 1, which shows the latent structures 
of the dictionary: the 90% Rest and the 10% Kernel, and within it the Core surrounded by 
its Satellites. Shown also is one MinSet (just one of many); all MinSets are part Core and 
part Satellite.  
Based on the data for word frequency (blue), concreteness (green) and age of acquisition 
(orange) from the psycholinguistic databases, the words in the Core for all four dictionaries 
are more frequent and learned younger than the Satellite words, which are in turn more 
frequent and younger than the Rest of the dictionary. The Satellites are more concrete than 
the Core or the Rest. The average values for each of the psycholinguistic variables in each 
of the latent substructures are shown in Figure 2. The pattern is the same for all four 
dictionaries. Because the results are based on the entire population of each dictionary 
graph, no statistical tests were done. All differences would be highly significant because 
the number of words in each dictionary is so big. The effects themselves, however, are not 
very big; there are clearly many other factors underlying these variables apart from the 
dictionary latent structures.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Average age, concreteness and frequency of words in Core, Satellites, 
Kernel and Rest. The pattern is the same for all four dictionaries: The Core is 
youngest and most frequent, then the Satellites, then the Rest. The Satellites are 
more concrete than the Core and the Rest, which are about equal (but see the 
gradients in Figure 6.) 
The effect size for each of the pairwise differences in Figure 2 is shown in Figure 3. Note 
that the biggest effect size tends to be for frequency. This may be because the 
psycholinguistic database coverage for frequency is close to 100% complete5 for all the 
words in all three latent structures, Core, Satellites and Rest, whereas the coverage for age 
and concreteness declines with frequency, especially for the two larger dictionaries (Figure 
4). It is possible that the effect sizes for age and concreteness would have been larger, 
especially for the larger dictionaries, if the database coverage had been more complete. It 
is likely that the incompleteness of the data for age and concreteness is itself an indirect 
effect of word frequency: Age and concreteness data are lacking for the less frequent 
words.  
All three variables – age, concreteness, and frequency – are intercorrelated 
(frequency/age: -0.5915; frequency/concreteness: 0.1583; age/concreteness: -0.3773). 
Decorrelating frequency from age and concreteness by recalculating effect sizes for only 
the residual variance left after removing the frequency variance reduces the effect sizes for 
age and concreteness (Figure 5). Age and concreteness data, which are much harder to 
gather than frequency data, are less available for less frequent words:  
“From a list of English words that one of the authors (M.B.) is currently compiling, we 
selected all of the base words (lemmas) that are used most frequently as nouns, 
verbs, or adjectives” (Kuperman et al 2012). 
“Because ratings are only useful for well known words, we used a cut-off score of 
85% known. In practice, this meant that not more than 4 participants out of the 
average of 25 raters indicated they did not know the word well enough to rate it. This 
left us with a list of 37,058 words and 2,896 two-word expressions (i.e., a total of 
39,954 stimuli)” (Brysbaert 2013). 
This introduces a frequency bias into our analysis, because of missing age and 
concreteness data for less frequent words. This frequency bias could either be (1) helping 
to reveal valid effects, (2) spuriously inflating them or (3) spuriously reducing them (Figure 
3); or (4) removing the frequency bias by decorrelating frequency could be masking valid 
effects (Figure 5). We think it is unlikely that word frequency causes concreteness or age 
effects. It is more likely that age of acquisition and concreteness are part of the cause of 
frequency effects. But the direction of causality cannot be resolved by the available data. 
 
 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Words	  in	  our	  four	  dictionaries	  that	  had	  no	  values	  for	  SUBTELXus’	  frequencies	  were	  assigned	  frequency	  value	  zero.	  The	  SUBTELXus	  frequency	  data	  were	  collected	  on	  a	  corpus	  used	  as	  the	  reference	  database;	  zero	  means	  the	  word	  never	  occurred	  in	  that	  corpus.	  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Effect size and direction for the principal comparisons among Core, Satellites, 
Kernel and Rest for age, concreteness and frequency, for each of the four dictionaries. 
Note that the effect size for frequency tends to be the biggest, then age, then 
concreteness.  
 	  
	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Percentage of words in Core, Satellites and Rest for which psycholinguistic data 
were available for age and concreteness for each of the four dictionaries. (Frequency data 
not shown because they are at 100% for all dictionaries.)  Note that the percentage of 
available data is lower for the two bigger dictionaries, and decreases from the Core to the 
Satellites to the Rest. 
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Figure 5. Effect size and direction for the principal comparisons among Core, Satellites, 
Kernel and Rest for age, concreteness and frequency, for each of the four dictionaries 
when correlation with frequency is removed.  Age and concreteness effects are reduced 
considerably (cf. Figure 3), especially for the bigger dictionaries, for which the 
psycholinguistic database coverage for age and frequency was lower for the less frequent 
words (cf. Figure 6). 
 
 
 
Definitional Distance Gradients. Alongside the main effects – the average differences in 
frequency, age and concreteness between the Core, Satellites and the Rest -- our analysis 
also revealed two kinds of graded effects:  
The upper part of Figure 6 shows the gradient for the K-Hierarchy, which is the definitional 
distance of words in the Rest of the dictionary from the Kernel (i.e. the number of 
definitional steps to reach a word starting from the Kernel). The first step in this gradient, 
from distance level 0 (the Kernel) to level 1 corresponds roughly to the main effects in 
Figure 2: For frequency there is a decrease from level 0 to 1 for all four dictionaries; then 
frequency is flat for all but Cambridge. For age there is an increase from level 0 to 1 (i.e., 
level 1 words are “older” -- i.e., learned later -- than the Kernel) for all four dictionaries, then 
descending slightly for all but WordNet. For concreteness there is a decrease (i.e., 
becoming more abstract) from 0 to 1, and then a gradual increase. Apart from the first step, 
from 0 to 1, the K-Hierarchy curves are hard to interpret because not only do the words at 
each succeeding distance level become fewer (Table 1) and less frequent, but the 
psycholinguistic database coverage for age (orange) and concreteness (green) is 
incomplete, especially for the two bigger dictionaries (Figure 7, left).  
The lower part of Figure 6 shows the gradient for the C-Hierarchy, which is the definitional 
distance from the Core for words in the Satellite layer (i.e. the number of definitional steps 
to reach a Satellite word starting from the Core). Here the gradients are consistent for all 
four dictionaries and all three psycholinguistic variables: they are descending (less 
frequent) for frequency, rising (getting older) for age, and rising (getting more concrete) for 
concreteness. Here too the number of words diminishes at each distance level (Table 2), 
but, for the two larger dictionaries there is a particularly marked decrease in database 
coverage for age (orange) and frequency (Figure 7, left). (This very visible negative 
correlation between definitional distance from the Core within the Satellite layer and 
psycholinguistic database coverage is probably due to the decline of word frequency with 
definitional distance from the Core within the Satellite layer (Figure 6, lower, blue). The red 
lines show the same effects when we analyze words that are present at the same level 
(intersection) in both large dictionaries (thick red line) and (separately) words that are 
present in both smaller dictionaries (thick red line). 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6:  Average age, concreteness and frequency at each level of the definitional 
distance hierarchy starting from the Kernel through the Rest of the dictionary (K-Hierarchy, 
above), and within the Kernel, starting from the Core through the Satellites (C-Hierarchy, 
below), for each of the four dictionaries. K-Hierarchy: for age there is a big increase from 
the Kernel to level 1 and then a slight decrease at higher levels; for concreteness a slight 
decrease from K to 1, then slight increase; for frequency a big decrease from K to 1, then 
mostly flat. C-Hierarchy: increases for age and concreteness and decreases for frequency. 
All effects are stronger in the smaller dictionaries. The thick red lines show that the pattern 
is the same when considering only those words that occur at the same level (intersection) 
in both bigger dictionaries. The thin red lines show the pattern for words that occur at the 
same level in both smaller dictionaries.   
  
 
 
 
 
Table 2.  Number of words at each level of the definitional distance hierarchy starting from 
the Kernel through the Rest of dictionary (K-Hierarchy, above), and, within the Kernel, 
starting from the Core through the Satellites (C-Hierarchy below), for each of the four 
dictionaries. Note that Figure 6 was truncated at the blue level past which frequencies 
became too low to be representative. Words past the truncation point were added to the 
blue value (total number of words for blue level shown in parentheses). 
 	  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Cambridge 2241 15935 9483 4122 1663	  (2796) 730 276 105 20 2 -­‐ -­‐ -­‐ -­‐ -­‐
Longman 2326 20555 12231 4966 1906	  (3025) 611 259 121 81 39 6 2 -­‐ -­‐ -­‐
Webster 10955 59160 38111 19860 9577 4396	  (7615) 1904 666 292 201 89 38 25 2 2
WordNet 9802 48186 26186 12642 5379 2248	  (4304) 989 609 293 125 32 7 1 -­‐ -­‐
K-­‐Hierarchy
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Cambridge 2008 127 51 26	  (54) 20 4 4 -­‐ -­‐ -­‐ -­‐ -­‐ -­‐
Longman 1786* 248 159 66 34	  (64) 14 6 4 4 2 -­‐ -­‐ -­‐
Webster 7976* 1220 640 425 245 153 106	  (287) 68 49 39 19 6 -­‐
WordNet 6391 1270 683 443 308 252 179 117	  (275) 77 56 17 6 2
C-­‐Hierarchy
	  	  	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Percentage of words at each level of the definitional distance hierarchy starting 
from the Kernel through the Rest of dictionary (K-Hierarchy, left), and, only within the 
Kernel, starting from the Core through the Satellites (C-Hierarchy right), for which 
psycholinguistic data were available for age and concreteness for each of the four 
dictionaries. (Frequency data not shown because 100% for all dictionaries.) Note that the 
percentage of available data is lower for the two bigger dictionaries, and that within the 
Satellite layer it decreases with increasing definitional distance from the Core in the C-
Hierarchy. 
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Core and Satellite Components of the MinSets. Because it takes so long to compute 
MinSets, even for the two small dictionaries, we do not have many of them yet; and for the 
two large dictionaries we so far only have one approximate MinSet each. Every MinSet is 
part-Core and part-Satellites. A natural question to ask is: What is the difference between 
the words in these two subcomponents of every MinSet? In the Kernel, the Core is more 
frequent, younger and less concrete than the Satellites. Comparing the words in the Core 
component of each MinSet with equal-sized random sets of Core words, and comparing 
the words in the Satellite component of each MinSet with equal-sized random sets of 
Satellite words also shows this ratio: For all four dictionaries, the Core component of the 
Minset is more frequent, younger and less concrete than its random counterparts, and the 
Satellite component is less frequent, older and more concrete (Figure 8). (This effect was 
confirmed by t-tests (p<0.001) for the two smaller dictionaries, for which we had enough 
Minsets (n=20 and n=19 for Cambridge and Longman respectively). Because we were only 
able to compute one MinSet each for the two larger dictionaries, we could not do t-tests, 
but their pattern of results was the same as for the small dictionaries.) The Core/Satelite 
effect is hence even more pronounced within the MinSets than within the Kernel.  
Comparing the Core, Satellites and Rest in terms of parts of speech again points to the 
Satellite layer, which has more nouns and fewer adjectives, adverbs and verbs than the 
Core or the Rest in all four dictionaries (Figure 9). This may be a hint of some sort of 
functional complementarity between Core and Satellites. Our digraphs and computations 
treat definitions as if they were just unordered strings of stemmatized content words’ first 
meanings, ignoring syntax and even part of speech – yet definitions themselves are all 
subject/predicate propositions. It is time to look into this formal black box, at the words 
themselves. There are very many words in the Core and the Satellites, and very many 
potential MinSets within each Kernel. But to get a better idea of what the functional role of 
Core and Satellite words might be in making up a MinSet, we are beginning in ongoing 
work to examine the respective words themselves, as well as the actual definitions of which 
they are each a part. 
 	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Comparing average age, concreteness and frequency of words in Minsets and equal-
sized random subsets of the Core (left) and the Satellites (right) for each of the four dictionaries. In 
all four dictionaries the average Minsets are younger, more concrete and more frequent than 
random Core words and older, more abstract and less frequent than random Satellite words. 
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 Figure 9. Percentage of parts of speech in the Core, Satellites and Rest for each of the 
four dictionaries. Note that the percentage of both nouns and adjectives is higher in the 
Satellite layer, whereas the percentage of verbs and adverbs is lower. 
 
 
 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
What we have learned from the graph-theoretic analysis of dictionaries so far is that 
knowing the meaning of a grounding set of as few as 373 words for a small dictionary of 
25,132 words (1st meanings only) or 1396 words for a larger dictionary of 91,388 words (1st 
meanings) we could in principle learn the (1st) meanings of all the rest of the words through 
definition alone. It does not follow, of course, that that is the way we actually do learn the 
meanings of all the rest of the words. If the grounding set was learned through direct 
sensorimotor experience, it is probable that a lot of later words are learned in a hybrid way, 
through a combination of direct experience and verbal definition (or description, or 
instruction or explanation). Most of our categories are not lexicalized at all, and are 
described (rather than defined) by ad hoc verbal descriptions: there is no dictionary entry 
for “things that are bigger than a breadbox,” for example, nor for “things that I saw last 
Tuesday” – nor even, in most people’s vocabularies, for “feeling glee at another’s 
misfortune.” But even the words in ad hoc verbal descriptions of unlexicalized categories 
have to be grounded, just as dictionary definitions have to be. So that’s back to the 
grounding set. 
Language and Propositions. One can equally well ask: “Why couldn’t the meanings of all 
words be learned through direct sensorimotor grounding?” First of all, if it really were 
possible to learn the meaning of every word through direct sensorimotor experience, then 
why bother to have words at all? Presumably it is to transmit what one of us has learned 
(say, via direct experience) to another who has not. Here we cannot avoid considering the 
question of the nature of language itself, and its adaptive value for our species. No other 
species speaks (in any modality, including gesture). What do other species lack, and what 
has ours gained, for having evolved the capacity for language? It is the ability to say 
anything and everything that can be said: the ability to express every possible proposition.  
Most of what we say consists of subject/predicate propositions (even questions and 
commands). Some propositions are “deictic” which means that they point to the 
sensorimotor here and now: “She is here.” Those are all function words, which were 
excluded from our dictionary analysis. We were only interested in content words, which, as 
noted, are the names of categories, and make up almost all the words in the dictionary. 
The kind of proposition that corresponds to most of what we say (when it is not deictic) is 
“Apples are red.” This could be the reply to someone who does not know, asking “What 
color are apples?” This is much like someone consulting a dictionary to find out what 
“apple” means, and learning (to a first approximation), that “An apple is a round, red fruit.” 
Age, Experience and Abstraction. So far, all these categories could have been learned 
either from a verbal definition or from direct sensorimotor experience: They are all pretty 
concrete, and they could all be learned early, fairly quickly, and without any particular risk. 
“Goodness, truth, and beauty” are becoming more abstract -- although “that’s good (true, 
beautiful)” and “that’s not good (true, beautiful)” could be learned from experience too. 
Learning what “quiddity” or “quark” mean nonverbally, from direct experience, would be 
quite a bit harder, and the meaning of “peekaboo-unicorn” (“A one-horned horse that 
vanishes without a trace whenever either senses or an instrument are aimed at it”) would 
be impossible to learn directly via the senses, whereas its verbal definition is as well 
grounded as the definition of apple. 
Now suppose the category that someone lacks is not apples but toadstools, and that the 
person is starving, and the only thing available to eat is edible mushrooms or poisonous 
toadstools that look very much like the edible mushrooms. Being told, by someone who 
knows, that “The striped gray mushrooms are poisonous toadstools” could save someone 
a lot of time (and possibly their life) by making it unnecessary to find out through direct trial-
and-error experience which kind is which.  
Category Learning: the Hard and Easy Way. And that, in a nutshell, is our hypothesis 
about the nature and adaptive value of language (Blondin Massé et al 2013): Language 
makes it possible to learn new categories by word of mouth, by recombining already 
grounded category names into propositions, instead of having to do it the hard way, from 
direct experience. But to do so, some words, at least, still have to be grounded in direct 
experience. The grounding would need to occur earlier, before the grounded words could 
be used to define and transmit further categories. And because grounding is sensorimotor, 
the grounding words would tend to be more concrete.6  
There is no reason to expect the grounding words to be unique and identical for everyone. 
The minimal grounding set of any individual’s mental lexicon might be like the basis set of 
an N-dimensional vector space: the basis can generate every point in the vector space, but 
it is not unique: just a set of N linearly independent points with the property that linear 
combinations of them can generate any and every point in the vector space. But, because 
people share a lot of common experiences, and this is in turn reflected in the vocabulary of 
their language, there is nevertheless reason to expect that some words will be part of many 
people’s grounding vocabularies, so those words would be spoken and written more 
frequently (see the frequency curves as well as the red curves for intersections in Figure 
6).  
This hypothesis is certainly not entailed by our findings on the greater frequency of Kernel 
words, the earlier age of acquisition of Core words, the greater concreteness of Satellite 
words, or the multiplicity of MinSets. But if the hypothesis were correct, it would help make 
sense of some of these findings: Not all. It remains a puzzle why Kernel words in the 
Satellite layer become increasingly concrete but also older and less frequent, the greater 
their definitional distance from the Core. We will not understand that until we get a better 
idea of the complementary role of Core words and Satellite words in making up a MinSet. 
But even for our two smallest dictionaries there are still very many words in their Kernels 
(over 2000), and they have very many different MinSets (each of c. 400 words each). So 
we are currently also generating tiny dictionaries by means of an online dictionary game: 
The participant is given a word, asked to define it, and then to define the words used to 
define it, and so on, until all the words used have been defined. This yields dictionaries with 
an average size of about 200 words, 90% of them in the Kernel, and with MinSets of about 
30 words, 2/3 of them Satellite words and 1/3 Core words (which is a reversal of our 
observed ratio for the full-size dictionaries) (Table 1). We hope that these much smaller 
dictionaries generated by individuals may reflect the way meanings are represented in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  There are some conceptual problems, however, with the notion of concreteness (Borghu 
& Binkofski 2014), and hence also with judgments of concreteness: To name a kind, like 
“apple,” rather than just a unique individual on a unique occasion, is already to abstract.	  
mental lexicon and will allow us to get a better idea of the complementary roles played by 
Core and Satellite words in jointly making up a MinSet.  
The question of the causal role of frequency is also an open one. There is no doubt that 
frequency is correlated with grounding -- the Core words are the most frequent ones, then 
the Satellites, then the Rest. The frequency gradient within the Satellite layer also follows 
this pattern, and there is no detectable frequency gradient in the rest of the dictionary, even 
though the frequency database is 100% complete. It may well be that some words are 
learned earlier because they are more frequent in the language: But why are they more 
frequent in the language? Frequency is undeniably the strongest of the psycholinguistic 
correlates of the latent structures of the dictionary. But its causal role must be explained by 
something other than frequency: It cannot be frequency all the way down, any more than it 
can be definitions all the way down. We hope this article will encourage “crowd-sourcing” 
the analysis of dictionary digraphs for further psycholinguistic variables as well as in further 
languages. 
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